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Equity vs. Inside Debt Compensation of CEOs and Firm Performance: New Evidence 
 
Susan Bianca Pollock 
 
 
This paper provides new evidence on the comparative effects of CEO inside debt and the components of 
equity compensation on firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. We find empirical evidence for the 
classic Jensen and Meckling (1976) premise that managers should be granted debt and equity in 
proportion to the ownership structure of the firm. We disaggregate the compensation structure into two 
components of inside debt: deferred compensation and accumulated pension. We also consider the four 
components of equity: including unvested shares, stock awards, estimated value of in-the-money 
unexercised options, as well as the estimated value of all other option awards. We also consider salary 
and bonus as short term incentives. We find that the effects of the different components of CEO 
compensation are dependent on the CEO’s time horizon, as measured by the expected period of 
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Agency problems associated with the separation of decision-making power and of risk-bearing from 
ownership represent serious challenges for publicly held corporations.  The literature in finance is rife 
with discussions about alternative preventive strategies for mitigating agency problems.  Fama and 
Jensen (1983) argue that separation of ownership persists in organisations in part because it benefits the 
organisation and because effective common approaches to control this agency problem and cost exist, 
the imperfect alignment and subsequent conflict of interest, is not without consequence. As per Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), agency costs are “as real as any other cost.”  
Several studies have demonstrated that equity compensation of CEOs is related to improved firm 
performance, consistent with the classical agency cost perspective (e.g. Jensen, Murphy 1990b, Lippert, 
Moore 1995 Guay 1999, Core, Holthausen et al. 1999, Ittner, Lambert et al. 2003, Switzer 2007).  The 
issue of debt compensation has received much less attention, however.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
speculate that to better align managers with all stakeholders, managers should be granted debt and 
equity in proportion to the ownership structure of the firm.  Equity compensation alone could encourage 
risk-taking behaviour, while recent empirical studies find that inside debt can reduce risk-taking (Edmans, 
Liu 2010, Wei, Yermack 2011, Anantharaman, Fang et al. 2013, Bolton, Mehran et al. 2015). 
This paper provides new evidence on the differential impact of equity vs. inside debt compensation of 
CEOs and firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q.  Inside debt as defined by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) includes defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation. As Edmans and Liu (2010), note, 
these components are as important as unsecured bonds to the firm, since they represent unfunded debt 
claims with equal priority to those of other unsecured creditors in bankruptcy. This study disaggregates 
executive compensation broken into three categories, i. bonus and salary, ii. four equity components, 
value of option awards, value of stock awards, value of unvested shares, estimated value in money 
options and iii. two inside debt components, accumulated pension benefits and deferred compensation 
aggregate.  The study’s key findings are that firm performance benefits when executive capital structure 
is tied to firm capital structure; we find evidence to support Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) speculation.  
We also find that to best incentivize executives; compensation structure should change with expected 
CEO tenure.  The expected time to retirement as such is not significant; young CEOs are not necessarily 
better than older. Equity compensation is better for young CEOs and while debt incentives are not good 
overall, they are better for older CEOs. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides a brief review of the 
literature. Section 3 introduces the hypotheses for testing.  Section 4 discusses the methodology and the 
data. The results are presented in section 5.  The paper concludes with a summary in section 6. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Monitoring and governance 
Internal mechanisms for mitigating the fundamental conflict of interest between the shareholders of the 
firm and the managers are typically categorized into types: 1. Direct and indirect  monitoring of managers 
by the board of directors, and 2. Adoption of Incentives that  align the interests of the manager with 
those of the shareholders (Denis, David J., Denis et al. 1999) – e.g. equity based compensation (Denis, 
Diane K., McConnell 2003).   
A basic tenet in corporate finance is that good corporate governance should  have a positive impact on 
the value of the firm, measured by Tobin’s Q (Morck, Shleifer et al. 1988) or in the valuation of cash and 
of cash flow (Gompers, Ishii et al. 2010, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith 2007).  The contribution of the board of 
directors to good governance remains a matter of controversy, however.  While it is theoretically in place 
to ensure the interests of the shareholders are represented, Perel (2003) for example states “many 
corporate boards function as entrenched and passive clubs, closely allied with the CEO, and not prone to 
exercising strong challenges.” Elson’s (2003) basic critique is that in the case of executive compensation, 
board members are often unqualified to make decisions on appropriate compensation. With the 
introduction of the “say on pay” provision in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, enacted on July 21, 2010, boards of publicly held firms must submit the executive 
compensation plan to a shareholder vote, the results of which are made public.  Evidence of a favourable 
effect on firm performance and on a subsequent downward adjustment of excessive executive pay has 
been documented (Denis, Diane K., Jochem et al. 2019). Other researchers propose that if “compensation 
could be cut without weakening managerial incentives” there would be tangible gains to the investors, 
though they warn that the influence managers have over their own compensation could be the most 
costly to the firm (Bebchuk, Lucian A., Fried 2006).  Marinovic and Varas (2018), however, argue that 
optimal compensation contracts allow for some manipulation. Compensation contracts should include 
performance-based vesting conditions (Bettis, Bizjak et al. 2010), otherwise incentives vest 
deterministically.  With manipulation vesting will depend on performance and the manager will exert a 
higher level of effort (Marinovic, Varas 2018).  
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Excessive CEO compensation has been the subject of much controversy.  One of the challenges for any 
organisation is attracting and retaining top talent.  In times of high demand, particularly for people who 
are capable of leading companies, compensation can skyrocket (Chambers, Foulon et al. 1998). CEO pay is 
several multiples more than the “average worker’s” pay.  In 1970, and including all CEO income, the 
average CEO earned 25 times that of the average industrial worker (Frey, Osterloh 2005).  In 1990 CEO 
pay was approximately on average 100 times that of the average worker.  Ten years later in 2000, it was 
approximately 350 to 570 times that of the average worker (Rynes, Gerhart 2000).  Brick and Palmon 
(2006) study CEO and director compensation and find that excess compensation, for both CEO and 
directors, is related to firm underperformance.  They also find that director and CEO compensation are 
related and conclude that “the evidence is consistent with excessive compensation due to mutual back 
scratching or cronyism.”   
Further, the board’s power to control agency issues is limited.  Decision making power is diffused among 
many agents in the organisation (as are agency costs).  Agency problems, and the consequential costs and 
impact to firm value, occur at many levels in an organization.  Projects or initiatives are often started at 
lower levels and then filtered up.  Ratification and monitoring, happening only at the board level, has 
limited impact.  Monitoring all activities would be prohibitively expensive, and monitoring cannot be 
comprehensive unless the monitoring agents become the managers themselves (Jensen, Meckling 1976).   
Alignment of ownership 
The second internal mechanism, alignment of ownership, is described by Jensen and Murphy (1990a) as 
the “most powerful link” between CEO wealth and shareholder wealth.   
In Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) formalization of the agency problem they explain that managers who do 
not own 100 percent of the firm they manage will incur agency costs to the firm.  If the manager owns, 
for example, only 95 percent of the stock, he or she “will expend resources to the point where the 
marginal utility derived from a dollar’s expenditure of the firm’s resources equals the marginal utility of 
an additional 95 cents of purchasing power (i.e., his share of the wealth reduction) and not one dollar.”    
Compensation using stock option awards or similar equity pay is expected to entice CEOs to adopt an 
optimal balance of risk and return to improve shareholder wealth; as cash compensation is unsuccessful 
at establishing this balance (Bryan, Hwang et al. 2000, Bryan, Hwang et al. 2005).  Equity compensation in 
a leveraged firm “serves as a pre-commitment device” to minimize the agency costs of debt (John, John 
1993).   Similar findings support the hypothesis that agency costs are reduced by increased CEO 
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ownership (e.g. Jensen, Murphy 1990b, Lambert, Larcker 1987, Lippert, Moore 1995 Guay 1999, Core, 
Holthausen et al. 1999, Ittner, Lambert et al. 2003, Switzer 2007).   
One of Jensen and Murphy’s (1990a) recommendations is that “CEOs should own substantial amounts of 
company stock”.  Those executives will experience a “direct and powerful ‘feedback effect’ from the 
market.” Despite the unapologetic statement, the authors, however, concede that it is not reasonable or 
possible in many firms due to the sheer size of the firm (Jensen, Murphy 1990a).  In 1990 Jensen and 
Murphy found that of the 250 largest American companies, the median CEO owned less than 0.07% of 
the company’s stock (Jensen, Murphy 1990a).  More recently, according to a 2005 study, the average CEO 
owns 0.0017% of the firm’s equity (Brick, Palmon et al. 2006).   
Empirical research, that focuses on financial firms, fails to support these findings.  One study found no 
correlation between bank CEO equity incentives and the bank performance during the Financial Crisis of 
2008 (Tung, Wang 2012), while another found no evidence that CEO incentive alignment performed 
better and even some evidence suggesting they performed worse (Fahlenbrach, Stulz 2011). 
Agency costs of debt 
Compensating with equity alone will give managers a stronger incentive to take riskier investments or 
projects (Jensen, Meckling 1976).  If the risky investments turn out well, the manager captures most of 
the gains, but if they turn out badly, the creditors bear most of the costs. Empirical evidence of risk 
shifting when executive stock option plans are introduced was has been found (DeFusco, Zorn et al. 
1991).   
Given a scenario where the manager must decide between one of two investment opportunities; one has 
a higher variance, but both are log-normally distributed, the manager can first issue debt, promise to take 
the low variance project, and sell bonds. Assuming the bondholders cannot prevent the manager from 
changing the investment decision, he/she can then take the high variance project and transfer wealth 
from the bondholders to him/herself as an equity holder.  Bondholders, in this scenario, will not actually 
lose. They presume the manager has opportunities to change projects due to his/her own maximizing 
behaviour (if no agreement exists) and consequently pay the appropriate amount for the bonds (i.e. the 
high variance project) (Jensen, Meckling 1976).   
External governance mechanisms include “the external market for corporate control (the takeover 
market) and the legal system” (Denis, Diane K., McConnell 2003). So in addition to opportunity wealth 
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loss caused by incentivizing higher risk projects, agency costs to the bondholders include the monitoring 
and bonding expenses by bondholders and the owner-manager and potentially, the bankruptcy and 
reorganization costs (Jensen, Meckling 1976).   
Inside debt is a more effective solution to the agency costs of debt than equity. The payoff is not only 
subject to the event of bankruptcy, but also to the value of the firm in bankruptcy (Edmans, Liu 2010).  In 
a firm with sufficient leverage, bonuses are not successful in eliminating agency costs of debt (Brander, 
Poitevin 1992).  Liu, Mauer et al. (2014) find a positive relationship between CEO inside debt and the 
firm’s cash reserves.  Further, they find that as firm becomes more leveraged, the positive relationship is 
magnified (Liu, Mauer et al. 2014).   
Debt-like pay is not, however, without caveats.  Wei and Yermack (2011) remark that an executive might 
notice a firm is failing and take early retirement, further stressing the liquidity of the firm.  Raviv and Sisli-
Ciamarra (2013) found that level of risk in executive compensation may vary with the state of the 
economy; the proportion of equity-based to debt-like compensation is less sensitive in a systemic crisis. 
The overarching evidence is not unilaterally in favour of CEO inside debt compensation. A recent study 
found that high inside debt holdings reduce the value of excess cash.  Executives take on risk averse 
behaviour, including the accumulation of excess cash.  Shareholders bear the cost of these lost 
opportunities while debtholders benefit (Belkhir, Boubaker et al. 2018). 
Optimal mix and inside debt 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) speculate that there is an optimal mix of executive debt ownership; the debt 
and equity held by “the manager” should have the same ratio as the firm’s equity to debt ratio.  They 
further caution that high debt compensation might motivate the executive to manage the firm too 
conservatively (Jensen, Meckling 1976).   
Empirical studies have shown that inside debt can reduce risk taking (Bolton, Mehran et al. 2015, 
Anantharaman, Fang et al. 2013, Edmans, Liu 2010).  Similarly, Wei and Yermack (2011) find that 
managers with inside debt tend to become less inclined to take on risk; they show “a general pattern of 




When CEOs have a high ratio of inside debt to equity compensation, they tend to have a lower cost of 
debt (Wei, Yermack 2011).  This is consistent with the results of simulations done by Parrino and 
Weisbach (1999).  Anantharaman, Fang et al. (2013) further find that firms have fewer bond covenants 
when the CEO has a inside debt in the form of a pension, and that the effectiveness of debt-like 
compensation in aligning incentives depends “crucially on the extent to which it exposes executives to 
similar risk of loss as unsecured outside debtholders.”   
The inside debt held by CEOs may be underestimated.  In addition to pension benefits and disclosed 
deferred compensation, “many executives receive substantial post-retirement perks, including payments 
for consulting services that may well represent compensation for services rendered before their 
retirement” (Bebchuk, Lucian A., Jackson Jr 2005). Further, some deferred compensation schemes allow 
the executive “to pass the tax costs of investment gains to their firms” (Bebchuk, Lucian A., Jackson Jr 
2005).  Even after the disclosure of deferred compensation was required by law, there continues to be a 
tax benefit for an executive who receives deferred compensation; it is often paid out after the executive 
retires (Wei, Yermack 2011).  Pay for performance after the CEO retires is costly for firms, and the 
effectiveness of such compensation is limited (Marinovic, Varas 2018). 
Financial firms and banks in particular are unique in that they are financed predominantly by debtholders 
(Van Bekkum 2016).  Debt-based compensation, however, limits bank risk and risk-taking, as found by 
Van Bekkum (2016).  They find that the results make sense in context since “bank shareholders worry 
about executives taking too little risk.”  The boards of these firms want to prevent underinvestment.  This, 
however, also has the effect of increasing shareholder volatility (Guay 1999).  Further, that while 
shareholder agency issues have received a great deal of “attention” in the past, other stakeholders, 
debtholders in particular, have received much less.  Equity incentives essentially shift risk to debtholders, 
and away from shareholders (Van Bekkum 2016).  When leverage is high, the potential for risk shifting to 
debtholders is large, and the positive influence of inside debt is expected to be high (Van Bekkum 
2016).  Van Bekkum (2016) finds that when CEO inside debt is relatively large for the more highly 
leveraged banks, the impact of the inside debt on “stock market losses, volatility, VaR, ES and CoVaR” are 
higher. 
CEO Horizons 
CEO compensation “shifts systematically” toward pension benefits and deferred compensation, and away 
from equity-based compensation, as CEOs age (Sundaram, Yermack 2007).  However, “deferred 
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compensation vests over time at an increasing rate” (Marinovic, Varas 2018) which creates an 
endogenous CEO horizon problem.  Executive compensation becomes increasingly sensitive to short-term 
performance over time; since “positive shocks” will accelerate vesting, which reduces long term 
incentives. Long-term incentives are most effective “at the beginning of a CEO’s tenure and decay toward 
the end” (Marinovic, Varas 2018).  
CEO’s incentive horizons are determined predominantly by the length of the vesting periods on their 
equity compensation grants (Ladika, Sautner 2018). Reductions in investment are linked to the CEO’s 
concern for the current stock price (Edmans, Fang et al. 2017).  Option acceleration led CEOs to cut both 
R&D and capital expenditure, and the magnitude of those cuts was directly related to decreases in CEO 
horizons (Ladika, Sautner 2018).  CEOs with greater short-term incentives spend less on long-term 
investment (Ladika, Sautner 2018) and similarly CEOs with shorter horizons, or shorter expected tenure, 
have a greater propensity to forego long-run investments (Antia, Pantzalis et al. 2010).  
While it is beneficial for firms to defer compensation, it is more effective while the CEO is still on the job 
rather than after he or she retires (Marinovic, Varas 2018) as CEOs place less importance on cash flow 
that occurs after retirement (Antia, Pantzalis et al. 2010).   The firm’s lifespan is longer than the CEO’s 
tenure, and managers approaching the end of their tenure tend to become myopic (Antia, Pantzalis et al. 
2010).  This myopia could lead CEOs to manipulate their compensation (Marinovic, Varas 2018) or 
encourage short-termism that includes, prematurely recognizing revenues and earnings (Jensen 2004), 
inflating reported earnings (Sun, Hovey 2017) or reducing long-term investment, at the expense of the 
firm. 
“Tolerating some level of manipulation is desirable because doing so allows the firm to elicit higher levels 
of effort than a manipulation-free contract” (Marinovic, Varas 2018). In addition, inducing “zero 
manipulation” would require a large postretirement compensation package that binds the CEO’s wealth 
to the firm.  There is also an endogeneity issue in the horizon hypothesis; stakeholders can anticipate the 
horizon problem as the CEO approaches retirement, and can accordingly adjust executive compensation 
agreements (Marinovic, Varas 2018). 
Short-termism is not necessarily solved by hiring a young CEO; age does not eliminate the possibility of 
manipulation in the short-term at the expense of the firm’s long term value (Antia, Pantzalis et al. 2010). 
Similarly, longer CEO horizons incentivize CEOs to focus on the long-term value of the firm (Antia, 
Pantzalis et al. 2010), but longer tenure of a CEO is also associated to an acceptance of “status quo” and 
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impaired financial performance (Hambrick, Geletkanycz et al. 1993).  Succinctly, “the optimal contract is 
nonlinear in performance” (Marinovic, Varas 2018).  Further, pay structure should not necessarily be 
static, optimal structure should change as incentives evolve with expected tenure.  The theoretical model 
proposed by Marinovic and Varas (2018) shows that CEO horizon matters in determining optimal 
incentive compensation structures.   
While deferred compensation can is usually long-term, pension is almost always a long-term incentive.  
Short-term incentives can lead to short-term action. Archambeault, DeZoort et al. (2008) predict that 
short term incentive-based compensation on audit committees increases the likelihood of accounting 
restatements due to error or fraud, while the opposite is true for long-term incentive compensation.  
Long-term incentives are expected to mitigate excess risk taking and encourage executives to take a long 
horizon view.  In the years after the financial crisis, and the massive government bailout in the United 
States, some researchers propose that executive incentive compensation should include only stock and 
stock options that cannot be sold for at least two to four years after the executive’s “last day in the 
office” (Bhagat, Romano 2009).  Similar to the bad-model problem where predicting expected behaviour 
in short time frames based on present conditions is less subject to error (Fama 1998), in investigations of 
long-term time horizons, and the many events that can affect firm performance, it is more difficult to find 
evidence of a causal link between, for example, long-term incentive pay (LTIP) and long-term firm 
performance.   
Inside debt and elite pensions 
Much of the literature addresses inside debt as a whole.  There are some key differences between 
deferred compensation and pension.  First, while deferred compensation can sometimes be long-term, 
pension is almost always a long-term incentive.  Second, pensions, base pay and long-term incentives are 
expected to be stable, as opposed to bonuses which are expected to be variable (Gerhart, Milkovich 
1990).  
Third, the debt incentive alignment as an explanation is up for debate.  Typically, executives have defined-
benefit plans that guarantee fixed payments for life.  Defined-benefits, unlike defined-contribution plans, 
shift the risk of poor investment performance to the firm from the executive employee.  Qualified 
pension plans for all employees provide tax benefits to the employees without increasing the firm’s tax 
rate.  Executives, however, are often paid substantially more, and qualified pensions have limits on them 
for each employee.  Pension plans, specifically for executives, are called supplemental executive 
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retirement plans (SERP).  SERPs do not have to be funded or secured, whereas rank-and-file plans (RAFs) 
which cover all employees, are funded and secured and protected under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (Anantharaman, Fang et al. 2013).  In addition to risk shifting toward 
the firm, the additional tax cost of SERPs is shifted from the executive to the firm.  “The long-term capital-
gains tax paid by individuals is lower than the marginal corporate tax rate paid by profitable companies” 
(Bebchuk, Lucian A., Jackson Jr 2005).  Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) argue that if SERPs were efficient, 
then they would be extended to all employees in a firm.  Further, they rebuke the possibility that SERPs as 
defined-benefit plans shift risk from the executives to the shareholders, who “are better able to bear such 
risk”, by saying that firms have been shifting from defined-benefit to defined contribution plans for 
regular employees, who are less able to shoulder additional risk than executives or shareholders.  
The elite pension plans were, up until regulation required their disclosure in 2006, considered a form of 
stealth compensation (Strier 2007).  Camouflaged compensation may enhance how an executive is 
perceived (Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, Fried 2004), and even though pensions and deferred compensation 
must now be disclosed, stealth compensation continues to exist.  For example, executives get dividends 
on unvested restricted stock grants.  Firms are not required to disclose these amounts; it’s up to each 
firm to decide if there is “material information” (Minnick, Rosenthal 2014).  Even with regulation, perhaps 
there is a perception benefit for the executive when his or her compensation takes the form of 
retirement benefits instead of cash or equity-based pay. 
Lastly, this “debt-serving explanation” assumes that companies do not pay out the unfunded executive 
pensions when facing bankruptcy.  This is not necessarily true as firms “often assume in full the 
company’s obligation to executives under defined-benefit plans even when they pay only part of the 
claims of financial creditors” (Bebchuk, Lucian A., Jackson Jr 2005). To align interests, pension payoff in 
“insolvency must be proportional to the firm’s liquidation value” (Anantharaman, Fang et al. 2013) and 
firms should commit to executive pensions in the same way they commit to other debts such bank loans, 
or private debt securities (Bebchuk, Lucian A., Jackson Jr 2005).  In a 2013 study, researchers hand 
collected data on funded and secured RAF plans and that of the unfunded and unsecured SERP and 
deferred compensation and found that the average value of RAF plans was 6% relative to total debt-like 
compensation (Anantharaman, Fang et al. 2013).  Despite the low overall secured portion of pension, 
“special arrangements in debt-like compensation could hence weaken or even nullify any incentive-
alignment effect” (Anantharaman, Fang et al. 2013).      
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In the tax-free world of Modigliani and Miller (1958), capital structure is irrelevant.  In the real world, 
where taxes and the tax-benefit of debt exist, it is assumed that firms choose an optimal capital structure 
that balances tax benefits with agency and bankruptcy costs.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) speculate that 
to better align managers with all stakeholders, managers should be granted debt and equity in proportion 
to the ownership structure of the firm.  Deviations in CEO compensation structure from the firm’s capital 
structure should, therefore, hinder performance.   
HYPOTHESIS 1: Firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q, will be greater when the difference 
between the debt to equity ratio of the CEO’s compensation and the debt to equity ratio of firm are 
minimized. 
 
Secondly, the optimal compensation structure should consider the expected tenure of the CEO.  Long-
term incentives at the beginning of CEO tenure are important to encourage a long-view horizon and 
prevent excessive risk-taking.  However, similar long-term incentives for a seasoned CEO could, in some 
cases, encourage short-termism, even though excessive risk-taking late in CEO tenure is expected to be 
deterred by the risk of bankruptcy and the takeover market. Executive compensation becomes more 
sensitive to short-term performance over time. Lower pay-for-performance sensitivity for option grants is 
related to longer CEO tenure, “suggesting the entrenchment effect of CEO tenure” (Ozkan 2011).  Higher 
salaries and bonus for older CEOs might discourage short-term myopia and potentially stock and earnings 
manipulation, while compensation that is deferred until after the CEO retires can be costly to the firm 
(Marinovic, Varas 2018). 
To incentivize the long horizon view, and optimal firm performance over time, the CEO’s debt 
compensation should start high and decrease toward the end of CEO tenure.  At the beginning of CEO 
tenure, the executive is likely to have less personal wealth invested in the firm. Bonuses incentivize early 
in CEO tenure but are later “eclipsed by accumulated equity incentives” (Guay, Kepler et al. 2019).  Bonus 
and salary are expected to be more relevant when the CEO has a long-expected tenure, though 
guaranteeing a large salary to a young CEO over the long-term is unlikely to predict optimal firm 
performance, salary and bonus are likely to be several times less than mid-career equity and debt 
holdings of most CEOs.  In my dataset, the average annual salary and bonus combined is $969,000 
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compared to the average sum of CEO inside debt and equity holdings of $10,271,000 (excluding 
estimated value of money options, which is on average $8,070,000). 
HYPOTHESIS 2: An optimal compensation structure depends on CEO time horizons and their influence on 
incentives in the form of equity, inside debt and salary.  The debt and salary incentives are expected to be 
optimal when they start high and decrease with time.  Equity incentives are expected to be optimal when 





4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:  
Analytical Methods: Measuring firm performance  
Using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable, we use regression testing to investigate the relationship with 
independent variables, along with several other control variables.   
The dependent variable Tobin’s Q is used as the measure of firm performance and is approximated as per 
Chung and Pruitt (Chung, Pruitt 1994). 
   
 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 =




𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐸𝑛𝑑 
“𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡" = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 −  𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 +  𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 
  
The numerator is composed of the market value of equity, preferred stock Liquid and debt, where i. 
market value of equity is the product of the firm’s share price and the number of common stock shares 
outstanding, ii. preferred stock liquid is the liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock, 
and iii. debt is the value of the firm’s short-term liabilities net of its short-term assets plus the firm’s long-
term debt.  The denominator is the book value of the total assets of the firm. 
Compensation structure (H1)   
To test our first hypothesis, that firm performance is optimal when the compensation structure of the 
CEO is identical to that of the firm, we take the absolute difference of the spread between the debt to 
equity ratio of the CEO’s compensation and the debt to equity ratio of firm.  The employed equations are: 
𝐾𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 = |
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟
− 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚
| 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐾𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 + 𝑎2 log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) +  𝑎3𝑅𝑛𝐷 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑎4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝑎5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑎6𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦





𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑
 
 
CEO Horizon and incentives (H2)    
To investigate whether CEO horizon matters in determining optimal executive pay structure, we 
introduce two-way interactive terms into the model for the salary, equity and debt incentives. 
The best available proxy for expected tenure, as opposed to past or current tenure, is time to retirement 
from the WRDS BoardEx database.  This assumes that CEOs retire at 64 years old, and the time to 
retirement variable becomes negative after the CEO turns 65.  For the most part, this assumption seems 
somewhat plausible, though if one assumes hard-working, driven people, with intrinsic motivations 
beyond “paying the mortgage” become CEOs, then 64 years old may be an underestimate.  (In my data 
10.14% of CEOs are 65 years old or older.) The variable of time to retirement could have noise, but in the 
absence of clairvoyant or individually hand-collected CEO survey data, it will suffice as the proxy for 
expected tenure. 
 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 = (𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 +  𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠)𝑥 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
= (𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 + 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠
+ 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑)𝑥 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
= (𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛




𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎2𝐾𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 +  𝑎3𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝑎4 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
+  𝑎5 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝑎6 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
+ 𝑎1 log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) +   𝑎7𝑅𝑛𝐷 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 +  𝑎8𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
+  𝑎9𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝑎10𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+  𝑎11 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 +  𝑎12 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
+  𝑎13 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝜀 
The model used include control variables for the firm, the log of the total firm assets to capture size 
effects and R&D to sales to account for investment in the future of the firm. Governance variables include 
the board size, board independence, which is a ratio of the independent board members to the total 
number of board members, a binary for CEO duality and the percentage of women directors on the 
board. A control variable for the financial crisis is 1 during years 2007 to 2009, and 0 otherwise.  Gender is 
a control variable in case there is an inherent difference in propensity to risk taking.  
Data 
The data for this study are for U.S. firms over the ten-year period from January 1, 2006 to January 1, 
2016.  Fundamental financial data and stock returns are obtained from Compustat and CRSP.  
Governance data and executive compensation were obtained from Execucomp and BoardEx.  The initial 
sample consisted of 20,885 firm-years. After excluding financial firms (SIC codes from 6000 to 6999) as 
well as firms with incomplete data, the final sample consists of 8585 firm-years.  
Table 1 provides some statistics on the dataset. The average size is $6.6 billion in total assets for all firms.  
The average inside debt compensation for CEOS is $2.6 million in accumulated pension for all firms, 
compared to $1.9 million in total deferred compensation.  CEOs held an average of $1.2 million in option 
awards, $2.0 million in stock awards, $2.6 million in unvested shares and $8.1 million in estimated in-the-
money unexercised options, across all firms.  CEO’s annual salary averaged $780,000 with an average 
bonus of $188,000.   
 [Please insert Table 1 about here] 
The average age of CEOs is 55 years old, with the oldest being 87 and the youngest at 29 years old.  The 
average time to retirement is 9 years, based on an expected retirement age of 64 years old. 
[Please insert Figure 1 about here] 
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 [Please insert Figure 2 about here] 
The variables and sources are summarized in the appendix. 
 
Correlations  
The variables in the model did not show problematic collinearity or correlation, based on Pearson 
correlation tests and Variance Inflation Factor tests.  Some of the correlations among the independent 
variables showed correlations with the firm size proxy, log of total assets. The debt incentive variable was 
moderately correlated at |r| = 0.379. Board size showed a high correlation of |r| = 0.614 and the 
percentage of women on the board showed a moderate correlation of |r| = 0.306 to the firm size.  Board 
size and percentage of women on board are also moderately correlated to each other at |r| = 0.357.    
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Results 
Table 3 summarizes the regression results of the first model, testing the Jensen and Meckling 
compensation structure hypothesis.   
 [Please insert Table 3 about here]  
 
 
The table below summarizes the results of the regression model testing for CEO horizon and incentives.   





5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
We do not reject the Jensen and Meckling (1976) hypothesis; tying executive capital structure to firm 
capital structure is positively related to firm performance.   
We also find support for our second hypothesis.  Time to retirement as such is not significant; young CEOs 
are not necessarily better.  Large salaries for younger CEOSs with longer expected time to retirement is 
not beneficial, and that equity compensation is better for younger CEOs.   
Debt incentives are generally not good overall but relatively better for older CEOs.  Our result for debt 
incentives over time is not significant, though leverage can unfavorably affect the market value of the 
firm which may explain it.  Interestingly, as CEO inside debt increases, the value of excess cash decreases, 
but for younger CEOs this effect is more pronounced.  The excess cash value of a Euro declines to 0.1766 
dollar for young CEOs and 0.5582 for older CEOs.  Likely implying that the established reputations of older 
CEOs and their track records are known to the market (Belkhir, Boubaker et al. 2018).   
Governance and Fixed Variables 
There were no surprises in firm fixed effects.  R&D expenditures are shown to increase valuation.   This 
makes sense as investment in the future should lead to increasing valuations.   Larger firms tended to 
have poorer performance.  
The literature on CEO duality is mixed.  Some argue that a CEO who also serves as the chairman of the 
board blurs the lines between ownership and control and exposes the firm to a greater risk of agency 
costs (Fama, Jensen 1983, Jensen 1993).  Despite firms granting these CEOs a great deal of power, others 
have found no correlation or no evidence between lowered performance and CEO duality (Iyengar, 
Zampelli 2009, Carty, Weiss 2012), or weak evidence, particularly when controlling for long-term results 
(Baliga, Moyer et al. 1996).  Others find mixed evidence, finding both that duality has a weak and 
insignificant effect of lower performance, but also that “duality is advantageous under conditions of 
resource scarcity or high complexity“ (Boyd 1995).  My results show a positive and significant relationship 
between CEO duality and performance.  
Board size was not significant.  Board independence, however, was surprisingly significant and negatively 
related to firm performance.     
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A recent study finds that the board’s gender diversity “strengthens the relationship between CEO pay and 
firm performance” (Usman, Farooq et al. 2019).  I found a positive, but insignificant, relationship between 
the percentage of women on the board and firm performance.  Overall the average number of women on 
boards is relatively low, on average 11.5%, but more has a relatively promising upward trend reaching 
18.49% in 2015. 
[Please insert Figure 2 about here] 
Discussions about gender and risk-taking, in particular, find that firms with female CEOs, on average, 
perform better and have lower risk levels, than those with male CEOs (Khan, Vieito 2013).  The authors 
further find that “boards do not consider the risk aversion differences” between women and men 
executives when deciding on the structure of pay-for-performance compensation. My results indicate 
that there is negative link between women CEOs and Tobin’s Q.  However, the number of women CEOs in 
my data was notably low.  Out of 8585 firm-year data points, 289 of those had women CEOs (3.4%).  The 
same percentage persists in the data before cleaning; 581 women CEOs out of 17,175 firm-years.  Though 
my data includes only a subset of American firms, the general trend is not terribly encouraging, with only 
modest increases in female CEOs from 2006 to 2017.   
[Please insert Figure 3 about here] 
The financial crisis, unsurprisingly, had a negative effect on performance, but the overall results don’t 






CEO pay is assumed to be required and not necessarily an issue of self-selection.  However, the decision 
on how to pay is the choice of the firm, often under influence from its top manager.  The choice of CEO 
compensation with debt or otherwise is not exogenous, and not fixed over time. Executive compensation 
is likely to be influenced by a firm’s business environment and other external factors including risk 
exposure and the nature of the agency problems (Van Bekkum 2016).  Firms and stakeholders need to 
understand how executive compensation structures affect firm performance and risk. 
Is balancing the stockholder-bondholder conflict using both equity and debt-like compensation enough to 
motivate performance with an optimal amount of executive risk-taking over time, without exposing the 
firm to managerial short-termism?  The risk of bankruptcy is not the only consequence; other forces like 
reputation, individual moral standards, or governance, may also work to curb undesirable behaviour.    
CEO compensation contracts are complicated, which suggests that the market is aware of the inherent 
complexities and externalities. In the words of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), “optimal incentive 
contracts tend to be complicated even in the simplest situations, making the models hard to work with in 
extended settings” (Holmstrom, Milgrom 1987).  
This paper provides evidence that the incentive alignment effect of compensation differs depending on 
the firm and on the CEO horizon. The argument that executive equity compensation aligns the manager 
with shareholders and that debt compensation aligns the manager with debtholders, is over-simplified.  
Many factors, including perhaps even details in the compensation contracts, such as, precise pension 
agreement terms and vesting time of various deferred payments, could work to influence firm 
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List of Variables 
Variable definitions and data sources.  
Variables Definitions Data Sources 
ComSharOutstanding Common shares outstanding at fiscal year end Compustat 
PriceCloseAnnFiscal Closing price shares at fiscal year end  Compustat 
PreferredStockLiquid Preferred stock liquidating value Compustat 
CurrentLiabilitiesTotal Liabilities due within one year, including the current portion of 
long-term debt 
Compustat 
TotalAssetsAT Firm total assets Compustat 
CurrentAssetsTotal Represents cash and other assets that are expected to be realized 
in cash or used in the production of revenue within the next 12 
months 
Compustat 
LongTermDebtTotDLTT Debt obligations due more than one year from the company's 
balance sheet date 
Compustat 
DateBecameCEO Date became CEO Execucomp 
ValueofOptionAwards Value of Option Awards Execucomp 
ValueofStockAwards Value of Stock Awards Execucomp 
EstValInMoneyOptions Estimated Value of In-the-Money Unexercised Execucomp 
ValueUnvestedatFYearEnd Value of Unearned/Unvested Shares at Fiscal Year End Execucomp 
AccumulatedPension Present Value of Accumulated Pension Benefits from All Pension 
Plans 
Execucomp 
TotalAggregateDefComp Total Aggregate Balance in Deferred Compensation Plans at Fiscal 
Year End 
Execucomp 
Gender Executive's gender Execucomp 
ExecutiveAge Executive's age at the data date Execucomp 
Tenure Calculated using the date the CEO became CEO in Execucomp and 
the data date in Compustat 
Compustat/ 
Execucomp 
boardSize Number of directors on the firm's board BoardEx 
SDsOnBoard Number of supervisory directors on the board BoardEx 
IndependentNEDonBoard Number of non-executive directors BoardEx 
ExecChairCombinedCEO CEO duality or executive chairman present (1- Yes, 0 - No) BoardEx 
IndependentNEDpastCFO Number of independent non-executive director with past CFO/FD 
role  
BoardEx 
PercentWomen Percentage of women on board BoardEx 
rndExpense Research and Development Expense Compustat 








Figure 1: Distribution of CEO age in the sample 
Figure 1 shows the age distribution of CEOs in the final dataset. (N = 8585) 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Time to Retirement in the sample 




Figure 3: Percentage of women on boards (2006 to 2015) 
Figure 3 shows the percentage of women on boards in final dataset which includes 8585 firm-years.  
 
Figure 4: Number of women CEOs (exclude financial firms) N=17175 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the variables that were used in the models, or in calculating 
model variables. N= 8585 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Total assets (millions) 6630.32 19551.84 0.54 346808 
R&D to sales 0.17 5.71 0 496.621 
Debt to equity 0.42 2.76 0 230.445 
Board independence 0.80 0.11 0 1 
CEO duality 0.60 0.49 0 1 
% of women on the board 0.11 0.10 0 1 
Financial crisis dummy 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Time to retirement 8.90 7.00 -23.8 35.5 
Executive age 55.55 7.01 29 87 
Tenure 7.90 6.88 0.005 43.999 
Salary (annual 000's) 780.42 358.78 0 5613.2 
Bonus (annual 000's) 188.28 1500.15 0 76951 
Value of stock awards (000’s) 1953.46 3155.16 -1845.69 66549.9 
Estimated value in money options (000’s) 8069.85 26540.39 0 713467.5 
Value of option awards (000’s) 1211.03 3061.28 -2018.44 90693.4 
Value of unvested shares (000’s) 2583.1 6741.44 0 171381.88 
Accumulated pension (000’s) 2583.65 6940.51 0 115822.29 





Table 2: Correlation table 
Table 2 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients of all the variables used in the regression models.  
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 8585  Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0         
    tobinsQ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Log of total assets 1 -0.1275                         
  <.0001             
R&D to sales 2 0.05373 -0.05558            
  <.0001 <.0001            
Board independence 3 -0.04639 0.19048 -0.0019           
  <.0001 <.0001 0.8603           
CEO duality 4 0.01125 0.19471 -0.00683 -0.08274          
  0.2973 <.0001 0.5268 <.0001          
% of women on board 5 -0.03136 0.30626 -0.02378 0.20627 0.06644         
  0.0037 <.0001 0.0276 <.0001 <.0001         
Board size 6 -0.08109 0.61483 -0.02012 0.19124 0.1025 0.35722        
  <.0001 <.0001 0.0623 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001        
crisisDummy 7 -0.07279 -0.08367 0.00988 -0.06612 0.03662 -0.07674 -0.02626       
  <.0001 <.0001 0.3601 <.0001 0.0007 <.0001 0.015       
genderDummy 8 -0.0228 -0.00469 -0.00439 0.04379 -0.02653 0.25555 0.02191 -0.01431      
  0.0346 0.664 0.6843 <.0001 0.014 <.0001 0.0424 0.185      
Absolute difference kdiff 9 -0.05661 0.00795 -0.00335 -0.08245 0.02487 -0.01185 0.01434 0.014 -0.00372     
  <.0001 0.4614 0.7562 <.0001 0.0212 0.2722 0.1839 0.1945 0.7302     
Time to retirement 10 0.07638 -0.12643 -0.00667 0.02418 -0.21313 -0.02623 -0.04933 0.08345 0.02113 -0.06416    
  <.0001 <.0001 0.5379 0.0255 <.0001 0.0154 <.0001 <.0001 0.0511 <.0001    
Salary ST incentive 11 -0.00086 0.1165 -0.0066 0.007 -0.01164 0.02607 0.08494 0.02152 0.00374 -0.01509 0.31275   
  0.9369 <.0001 0.542 0.5182 0.2825 0.0161 <.0001 0.0468 0.7297 0.1634 <.0001   
Equity LT incentive 12 0.23671 0.22686 -0.00595 0.03832 0.0444 0.07332 0.12865 -0.05092 -0.01224 -0.03713 0.27407 0.22411  
  <.0001 <.0001 0.5829 0.0004 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2584 0.0006 <.0001 <.0001  
Debt LT incentive 13 -0.0014 0.37916 -0.00876 0.139 0.11677 0.17701 0.26986 -0.00652 0.00379 0.01546 0.08954 0.11768 0.29082 




Table 3: Summary of Regression Results – H1 
The table below shows all regression results for the model testing H1, Jensen and Meckling’s debt 
proportion premise, with dependent variable Tobin’s Q.  P-values are reported in the parentheses.  The 
number of observations, adjusted R2 and the coefficient of variation for the model are provided.  ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(1) Results for the model: 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐾𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 + 𝑎2 log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) +
 𝑎3𝑅𝑛𝐷 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑎4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝑎5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑎6𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
 𝑎7 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 + 𝑎8 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑎9 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝜀   (2) The 
model without log of total assets.  (3) The model with Industry dummies, which are used but not shown.  
 
Variables Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Absolute difference kdiff -0.00714*** -0.00721*** -0.00608*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Log of total assets -0.10085*** - -0.06329*** 
 [0.000] - [0.000] 
R&D to sales 0.00954*** 0.01068*** 0.00806*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Board independence -0.30984*** -0.42192*** -0.23918** 
 [0.0088] [0.0004] [0.0434] 
CEO Duality 0.09217*** 0.04655* 0.04399* 
 [0.0004] [0.0688] [0.0794] 
Percentage of women on board 0.17128 0.02968 -0.1158 
 [0.218] [0.831] [0.405] 
Board size 0.00028918 -0.04078*** -0.00684 
 [0.969] [0.000] [0.3516] 
crisisDummy -0.20631*** -0.18561*** -0.20094*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
genderDummy -0.17735** -0.1397* -0.22798*** 
 [0.0178] [0.063] [0.0017] 
Intercept 2.35467*** 2.09802*** 1.46205*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Industry Dummies No No Yes 
Observations 8585 8585 8585 
Adj R-Sq 0.0306 0.0195 0.1201 
Coeff Var 84.74248 85.2276 80.73545 
30 
 
Table 4: Summary of Regression Results – H2 
The table below shows all regression results for the model testing H2, the CEO horizon incentives, with 
dependent variable Tobin’s Q.  P-values are reported in the parentheses.  The number of observations, 
adjusted R2 and the coefficient of variation for the model are provided.   
(1) Results for the model: 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎2𝐾𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 + 𝑎3𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝑎4 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 +
 𝑎5 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝑎6 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝑎1 log(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) +   𝑎7𝑅𝑛𝐷 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 +
 𝑎8𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑎9𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑎10𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑎11 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 +
 𝑎12 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝑎13 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝜀  (2) The model without log of total assets.  (3) 
The model with Industry dummies, which are used but not shown.  
 
Variables Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Absolute difference kdiff -0.00586*** -0.00578*** -0.00515*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Salary ST incentive -2.34E-06*** -3.19E-06*** -2.31E-06*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.0002] 
Equity LT incentive 1.18E-06*** 1.08E-06*** 1.08E-06*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Debt LT incentive -1.38E-07 -6.52E-07*** -1.85E-07 
 [0.3983] [0.000] [0.2453] 
Time to retirement 0.00005302 0.00495** -0.00118 
 [0.9782] [0.0102] [0.5341] 
Log of total assets -0.14198*** - -0.11203*** 
 [0.000] - [0.000] 
R&D to sales 0.0091*** 0.01072 0.00765*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Board independence -0.22515* -0.352*** -0.16058 
 [0.0515] [0.0025] [0.1677] 
CEO Duality 0.08993*** 0.04986* 0.04287* 
 [0.000] [0.0521] [0.0858] 
Percentage of women on board 0.12906 -0.01982 -0.10193 
 [0.3422] [0.8849] [0.4564] 
Board size 0.00262 -0.04865 -0.0034 
 [0.7166] [0.000] [0.6358] 
crisisDummy -0.18023*** -0.15852 -0.17725*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
genderDummy -0.15037** -0.11103 -0.19758*** 
 [0.037] [0.1274] [0.005] 
Intercept 2.4626*** 1.98778 1.63202*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Industry Dummies  No No Yes 
Observations 8585 8585 8585 
Adj R-Sq 0.102 0.0824 0.1754 
Coeff Var 81.50309 82.38902 78.09927 
 
 
